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 Implicit Memory research has been investigating the attentional 
requirements needed for something to be encoded and accessible through 
implicit memory.  So far, previous research has produced mixed results on 
attentional requirements for perceptual implicit memory, some studies citing 
evidence for the need of attention, others citing the opposite. As well, research 
has been consistent in producing results showing that conceptual implicit 
memory has higher attentional demands than that of its perceptual counterpart. 
Adopting Transfer-Appropriate Processing framework, the current paper 
investigates attention requirements for both a perceptual task (picture 
identification) and a conceptual task (category exemplar generation). Participants 
examine webpages with advertisements embedded in both an ad-engaged and 
webpage-engaged condition manipulation. Study 1 had participants perform 
speeded picture identification, whereas Study 2 had them perform a category 
exemplar generation task. Results were consistent with TAP framework and 
showed that, when not accounting for explicit contamination, the perceptual task 
did not significantly differ between conditional manipulations, whereas the 
conceptual task produced results highlighting the need for attention and deeper 
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IMPLICIT MEMORY AND ONLINE ADVERTISMENT PRIMING 
Introduction 
Implicit memory (IM) and explicit memory (EM) are two commonly cited 
categories of the long-term memory. The use of IM occurs when an individual’s 
past experiences facilitates performance on a test or activity that does not require 
the individual to deliberately or consciously recollect those experiences (Ramos, 
Marques, & Garcia-Marques, 2017; Roediger & McDermott, 1993; Schacter, 
1987). Conversely, explicit memory (EM) is used when individuals consciously 
remember previous information or experiences to increase performance on a 
task (Craik, Moscovitch, & McDowd, 1994; Ramos et al., 2017; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1993; Schacter, 1987). Throughout this paper, the terms implicit and 
explicit will be used in reference to different tasks, distinguished operationally by 
the instructions participants are given during the test phase.  
Tests of IM and EM share three general phases (Roediger & McDermott, 
1993). The first phase – the study phase – consists of participants studying a set 
of study materials (usually a set of words or pictures). During this phase, 
participants study the material intently. Following this, participants then enter the 
distractor phase. This is a task or activity used to have participants shift focus 
from what they had just studied to remove ceiling effects and allay demand 




function in that it is used as an attempt to avoid explicit contamination during the 
test phase (MacLeod, 2008; Mitchell & Bruss, 2003).  Explicit contamination 
refers to participants’ awareness of the relationship between the study phase and 
the test phase. The participants are presumed to explicitly remember stimuli 
between the study phase and the test phase when a study is contaminated with 
EM (MacLeod, 2008; Mitchell & Bruss, 2003). This will be discussed in greater 
detail in the next section. The third and final phase is the test phase. This is 
where participants’ memory is tested, and responses are recorded. For an 
explicit test, the participant is given deliberate instructions to reflect on the study 
phase and use that knowledge to help performance. However, when testing 
implicitly, the participants are given no instructions to reflect on the study phase. 
Rather, they are asked to answer quickly or to the best of their abilities (Roediger 
& McDermott, 1993). Superior performance on studied items relative to new 
items suggests that memory rose to aid performance in the absence of explicit 
recollection, the operational definition. Particular methods revealing this follow.   
Measuring IM and EM 
 While investigation of the two methods share three general phases, other 
aspects are quite different. The biggest difference, as established above, is the 
way in which participants are tested. For explicit tests, participants are allowed 
conscious recollection of prior study items. For implicit tests, the recollection is 




McDermott, 1993). EM is easier to measure because the researcher simply 
counts the correct number of responses given by the participant on any type of 
EM test (e.g. free recall, cued recall, recognition). Then, the participant is given a 
score for those responses, and in turn, creates the measure for the participants’ 
EM.  
Implicit tests are more complicated. In order to be sure implicit memory is 
being measured without explicit contamination, researchers have developed 
specific tasks (e.g. word fragment or stem completion) to assess the level of 
priming that occurs. These two tasks involve participants completing fragmented 
words (b_r_ or ba__) with the first word that comes to mind (e.g. bark, barn, etc.). 
These, among other implicit tasks, will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
section. The ability to perform better for old items – items seen during study - 
compared to new items has been coined priming (Isingrini, Vazou, & Leroy, 
1995; McDermott & Roediger, 1994). 
Perceptual Tests versus Conceptual Tests of IM  
Previous researchers have classified two types of implicit tests: 
conceptual and perceptual (Blaxton, 1989; Jacoby, 1983; McDermott & Roediger, 
1994; Tulving & Schacter, 1990). While the concepts of conceptual and 
perceptual priming can be applied to explicit tests, we focus here on implicit tests 
(Roediger, 1990; Roediger & McDermott, 1993). Conceptual and perceptual tests 




used. Mitchell and Bruss (2003) and Roediger and McDermott (1993) reviewed 
roughly 12 different implicit tests, both conceptual and perceptual. These tests 
include but are not limited to: word fragment or word stem completion, perceptual 
identification, and category exemplar generation. I have selected these four tests 
for specific reasons. Word fragment completion and word stem completion 
appear to be the most widely used perceptual tests of IM. Perceptual 
identification is the perceptual test of IM that will be used for this study, and 
category exemplar generation is a commonly used conceptual test of IM that will 
be implemented in the current study. 
Perceptual tests of IM. Perceptual tests of IM challenge a participant’s 
perceptual system. For example, participants might identify perceptually altered 
words or pictures (as in word fragment completion tests, or degraded picture 
identification; McDermott & Roediger, 1994). Perceptual priming occurs when the 
stimulus presented in the test phase is perceptually related to the partially 
degraded or briefly presented stimulus in the study phase (Isingrini et al., 1995). 
The remainder of this section reviews four different perceptual tests of IM.  
Word fragment completion is a perceptual test of implicit memory. Words 
that were presented to participants as study items, are again presented to them 
in the test phase only this time they are partially degraded (e.g., elephant → 
e_e_h_n_; Mitchell & Bruss, 2003). Participants complete the fragmented word 




when they are able to fill in the fragments with words that correspond to the study 
list at a greater rate than unstudied words that could complete the fragment 
(Parkin & Streete, 1988). The reader is reminded that the participant is not 
instructed to reflect on the studied list. Perceptual priming occurs because of the 
physical overlap of the letters between the word shown during the study phase 
and the words used during the test phase. Word fragment completion has been 
used to measure implicit memory by several different researchers (e.g. Mulligan 
& Hartman, 1996; Tulving, Schacter & Stark, 1982). 
Word stem completion is another perceptual test that is almost identical to 
word fragment completion. Word stem completion works the same as word 
fragment completion, except the missing letters are placed in order (blink → 
bl__). This is more challenging because the words are harder to identify – for 
example, participants could easily write in “blank” instead of “blink.” Again, the 
similarities between the stimuli at study at test create perceptual priming, and 
priming occurs when participants are able to complete the word stem with a word 
that corresponds to the previously studied list (Mitchell & Bruss, 2003; Roediger 
& McDermott, 1993). Mitchell and Bruss (2003) found over 20 studies using word 
stem completion to research age differences. Graf, Squire, and Mandler (1984) 
used word stem completion to test the memory of amnesic patients. This test of 
implicit memory has been used immensely, and is still being used to research the 




Perceptual identification priming is measured by the accuracy in which 
participants can name previously studied words relative to new words, when the 
words are briefly exposed to the participant (Crabb & Dark, 1999; Jacoby & 
Dallas, 1981; Mulligan, 2002; Warren & Morton, 1982). Jacoby and Dallas (1981) 
had test words (both old and new) flashed on a screen for 35ms. Participants 
reported each word immediately after its presentation. Their results showed 
significant priming for perceptual identification, with an astonishing effect size, r2 
= .74. Although using words for perceptual identification has shown positive 
results for priming (Crabb & Dark, 1999; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mulligan, 2002; 
Warren & Morton, 1982), researchers have begun using pictures to gauge and 
test priming on perceptual identification (Park & Gabrieli, 1995; Mulligan, 2002).  
Pictures have been used in implicit memory testing because they have 
shown to have superior priming abilities to that of words, a phenomenon known 
as picture superiority (Cherry & St. Pierre, 1998; Durso & Johnson, 1979; Mitchell 
& Bruss, 2003; Srinivas, 1993; Stenberg, 2006; Warren & Morton, 1982; Weldon 
& Roediger, 1987; Weldon, Roediger, Beitel, & Johnston, 1995). According to 
Park and Gabrieli (1995), because of the development of the Transfer-
Appropriate Processing theory (see below), early picture priming studies were 
focused on the nature of the mental processes engaged at study and revealed at 
test. Researchers have shown strong support that picture priming is heavily 




picture priming (Durso & Johnson, 1979; Srinivas, 1993; Warren & Morton, 1982; 
Weldon & Roediger, 1987). These studies showed greater priming effects when 
participants were presented with the same modality at study and test (picture-to-
picture), relative to a cross-modality presentation (words-to-pictures). They also 
showed that pictures produce higher priming rates relative to words. Also, 
McDermott and Roediger (1994) showed that pictures primed picture fragment 
identification, whereas words did not; words primed word fragment completion, 
whereas pictures did not; and imagining a picture when given a word enhanced 
picture fragment identification but not word fragment completion; imagining a 
word when given a picture enhanced word fragment completion but not picture 
fragment identification.  Again, this highlights the perceptual overlap needed for 
strong priming to occur with pictures. For this reason, as well as because 
Transfer-Appropriate Processing theory supports the use of pictures, the current 
study will use perceptual identification with pictures as the stimuli.  
Conceptual tests of IM. Contrary to perceptual tests of IM, participants in 
a conceptually based test draw on their general knowledge to answer semantic 
based questions (e.g., “what is the largest animal on Earth?”) or to freely 
associate to semantic cues (e.g., “Name the first six car brands that come to 
mind; McDermott & Roediger, 1994). Conceptual tests provide stimuli information 
that is conceptually related to stimuli in the study phase, however there are little 




require substantial semantic processing before priming occurs (Isingrini et al., 
1995). The most commonly used conceptual test of IM is the category exemplar 
generation task (Mitchell & Bruss, 2003).  
Category exemplar generation is strictly a conceptual test of implicit 
memory (Mitchell & Bruss, 2003; Roediger & McDermott, 1993). When using 
category exemplar generation as a test of implicit memory, participants are 
typically shown a list at study of different names that correspond to any number 
of categories (e.g. Lexus from car brands.). Upon entering the test phase, 
participants are given a category heading – such as car brands – and told to list a 
few items that fit in to that category. Priming occurs if participants list items under 
the category heading that correspond to previously studied items and omit non-
studied items. This test is conceptual because there is no overlap of surface 
features between study and test materials and because test performance relies 
on the recapitulation of conceptual processing engaged at study (McDermott & 
Roediger, 1994; Park & Gabrieli, 1995). 
Explicit Contamination in IM Tests 
One thing to be aware of when assessing priming is the potential of 
explicit contamination (as noted above). Again, explicit contamination occurs 
when participants become aware of the relationship between the test phase and 
study phase, and then use this knowledge to boost their performance on the 




(MacLeod, 2008; Mitchell & Bruss, 2003). For example, in a word fragment 
completion task, participants complete the fragmented word (b_i_k) with the first 
word that comes to mind (b_i_k -> blink; Mitchell & Bruss, 2003; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1993). If the participant completes the fragment with the first word 
that comes to mind, and if the word corresponds to a previously studied item 
more often than a non-studied item, then priming has occurred. However, explicit 
recognition of the fragments as suggestive of the words studied would represent 
an explicit contamination. 
Roediger and McDermott (1993) and MacLeod (2008) have outlined nine 
recommendations for researchers to avoid contamination: 1.) test amnesiac 
individuals; 2.) obtain a (double) dissociation; 3.) meet the retrieval intentionality 
criterion; 4.) disguise the test; 5.) use test-awareness questionnaires;                
6.) minimize the value of conscious recollection; 7.) use process dissociation 
procedures; 8.) use speeded tests; and 9.) employ relearning and savings 
techniques. For the purpose of this paper, we will focus on recommendations 2, 
3, 4, 5, and 8 (for a full review see MacLeod, 2008; Roediger & McDermott, 
1993).  
This first recommendation is to obtain a dissociation between the explicit 
and implicit measures through an experiment. Jacoby and Dallas (1981) 
demonstrated this by manipulating the levels of processing of words during 




the other half tested using explicit recognition. Generally, their results showed 
that deeper levels of processing had a large effect on the recognition task, but no 
effect on the priming of the word fragments (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). 
Dissociations between implicit and explicit tests will be discussed in detail in the 
next section.  
The second recommendation has been coined the “retrieval-intentionality 
criterion” (Shacter, Bowers, & Booker, 1989). The basic idea of this method is to 
hold all conditions that would affect participants constant at study and test, 
except for instructions given during test (MacLeod, 2008; Roediger, 1993). Graf 
and Mandler (1984) conducted a study similar to that of Jacoby and Dallas 
(1981). They manipulated the levels of processing at study by having participants 
rate words for semantic features or non-semantic features. All participants were 
given three-letter word stems. Half were told to say the first word that comes to 
mind (implicit test) whereas the other half were told to reflect on their studied list 
and use those words to fill in the stems (explicit test). Under these conditions, the 
only thing that varied between the participants was the instructions given at test. 
Their results, like Jacoby and Dallas (1981), produced a dissociation between the 
explicit and implicit test, showing that evinced deeper processing affected the 
explicit form of the test but had little effect on the priming of the implicit test (Graf 




The third recommendation is to merely disguise the implicit test, so that 
participants are not aware that it is a memory test. This method will be 
implemented in the current study. Bowers and Schacter (1990) used a title that 
did not cause demand characteristics. MacLeod (1989) told his participants that 
the test they were taking was for another one of his colleagues, and that it was 
not the memory test for which they had be recruited. Others represented the 
implicit task as a “filler” task before they were to take the actual memory test. 
MacLeod (2008) advocates for the use obscuring the study material in some sort 
of larger context, for example, embedding target ads in to a webpage (Northup & 
Mulligan, 2014). This would reduce the single focus of the study material and 
decrease – if not eliminate - explicit contamination because it would make 
conscious retrieval less tempting and presumably less successful (MacLeod, 
2008).  
The fourth, and one of the most commonly used recommendations to 
reduce explicit contamination is the use of test-awareness questionnaires. This 
method is straightforward. Following the memory tests, subjects are given 
questionnaires to gauge “awareness” of the overlap of material between study 
and test (MacLeod, 2008; Roediger & McDermott, 1993). According to Schacter 
and Bowers (1990), “test-aware” participants were ones who said, that at some 
point during the test, they realized that some of the words they were producing 




any awareness of similarities between study stimuli and test stimuli (Schacter & 
Bowers, 1990). Test-awareness questionnaires have their flaws (see Roediger & 
McDermott, 1993), however, many researchers have found them to be useful 
and recommend using them as an attempt to avoid explicit contamination or at 
least to qualify the results of a presumably contaminated study (McAndrews & 
Moscovitch, 1990; Richardson-Klavehn, Gardiner, & Java, 1994; Schacter & 
Bowers, 1990).  
The fifth and final recommendation used to catch and or avoid explicit 
contamination is the use of speeded tests, particularly relevant to the current 
study. Speeded tasks effectively preclude the conscious study-task reflection that 
portends explicit contamination. Typically, researchers have use speeded 
naming (for words) as the implicit test (MacDonald & MacLeod, 1998; MacLeod, 
1996; MacLeod & Daniels, 2000; MacLeod & Masson, 2000). For these 
experiments, researchers recorded the time needed for participants to read aloud 
words presented to them. Other studies have leaned towards measuring the 
accuracy of naming a word or picture presented to participants at extreme 
speeded presentation intervals, barely at the threshold of perception (Jacoby & 
Dallas, 1981; Warren & Morton, 1982; Crabb & Dark, 1999). For example, 
Jacoby and Dallas (1981) asked participants to name stimuli that were flashed to 
them on a screen for 35ms. When words or images are presented at such high 




for explicit contamination to take place. The current study will use speeded 
picture naming (also referred to as perceptual picture identification) because of 
its presumed ability to preclude explicit contamination (Brown, Jones, & Mitchell, 
1996; Brown, Neblett, Jones, & Mitchell, 1991; Mitchell, Brown, & Murphy, 1990; 
Mitchell & Bruss, 2003).  
Potential of Attention to Dissociate of IM and EM 
To combat explicit contamination, researchers attempt to find a 
dissociation between explicit and implicit tests. A dissociation occurs when 
variables that effect one type of test have opposite or no effects on the other type 
of test (Weldon et al., 1995). A groundbreaking dissociation was found for 
amnesic patients (Graf et al., 1984; Graf & Schacter, 1985; Warrington and 
Weiskrantz, 1970). Amnesic patients showed preserved priming on implicit tests, 
such as word fragment completion, but they had vastly impaired performance on 
explicit measures, such as free recall. Warrington and Weiskrantz (1970) showed 
that amnesic patients could not deliberately recall words they had been 
presented in the study phase but would complete the word fragments with words 
they had previously studied. Since then, numerous variables have been tested 
involving implicit and explicit memory. Due to the sheer volume of studies, we 
have omitted mention of the studies involving implicit procedural memory that are 
beyond the scope of this paper (see Roediger, 1993 for a full review). An 




attention at encoding. This is a topic that has produced mixed results regarding 
how attention affects implicit tests, specifically perceptually driven tests.  
Debate over Attentional Requirements of IM 
Early attention requirement studies showed effects similar to those of the 
amnesic patient studies – performance on explicit memory tasks, but not implicit 
memory tasks, was decreased due to divided attention at encoding (Isingrini et 
al., 1995; Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989; Mulligan, 1998; Mulligan & 
Hartman, 1996; Parkin, Reid, & Russo, 1990; Parkin & Russo, 1990; Schmitter-
Edgecombe, 1996; Szymanski & MacLeod, 1996). However, further investigation 
showed that attention manipulations had variable effects across different implicit 
memory tasks, reducing priming on some tasks (e.g., Crabb & Dark, 1999; 
Gabrieli et al., 1999; Light, Prull, & Kennison, 2000; Mulligan & Hartman, 1996; 
Rajaram, Srinivas, & Travers, 2001; Schmitter-Edgecombe, 1999), but not on 
others (e.g., Bentin, Kutas, & Hillyard, 1995; Mulligan & Hartman, 1996; Mulligan 
& Peterson, 2008; Smith & Oscar-Berman, 1990; Spataro, Mulligan, & Rossi-
Arnaud, 2010; Spataro, Mulligan, & Rossi- Arnaud, 2011). Of those studies that 
found reduced priming, many of them were in the context of a conceptual task 
(Crabb & Dark, 1999; Gabrieli et al., 1999; Mulligan & Hartman, 1996).  
According to Transfer-Appropriate Processing (TAP), implicit memory 
tasks drawing heavily on conceptual priming should be affected by attention, 




manipulations of attention. This is because a conceptual implicit task acts in the 
same manner as an explicit task, wherein deeper encoding evinces priming 
(Roediger, 1990). However, as mentioned previously, the global importance of 
attention at encoding is unresolved because studies focused on perceptual forms 
of priming have produced mixed results – some finding no effects of divided 
attention on perceptual priming (e.g., Mulligan, 1998; Mulligan & Hartman, 1996; 
Parkin et al., 1990; Parkin & Russo, 1990; Russo & Parkin, 1993; Schmitter-
Edgecombe, 1996; Szymanski & MacLeod, 1996), with others reporting 
substantial reductions (e.g., Crabb & Dark, 1999; Hawley & Johnston, 1991; Light 
& Prull, 1995; Stone, Ladd, Vaidya, & Gabrieli, 1998). Because of this, the 
current study will manipulate attention at study and use a perceptual method 
(perceptual identification) of testing.  
TAP Explains Perceptual and Conceptual Attentional Difference 
 Currently there is debate concerning which theoretical framework better 
explains the occurrence of dissociations between IM and EM. The two 
frameworks that are currently in debate are: dual memory systems (e.g., Cohen 
& Squire, 1980; Schacter, 1989; Squire, 1986, 2016; Tulving, 1983, 1985; 
Weiskrantz, 1987, 1989) or transfer-appropriate processing approach (Craik, 
1983; Graf & Mandler, 1984; Jacoby, 1983, 1988; Kolers & Roediger, 1984; 
Masson, 1989; Roediger, 1990; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987a, 1987b; Roediger & 




1990 article, he limits his discussion of the theories of implicit memory to TAP 
and a few neurological implications, but broadly allows the dissociation between 
perceptual and conceptual task to drive the discussion of theory, a practice we 
will emulate here. As mentioned previously, this study will be based on the TAP 
framework and will aim to add further support for this theory governing the 
dissociations between IM and EM.   
 Rather than there being two (or more) memory systems at play, TAP 
implies that dissociations occur because different types of tests (perceptual vs. 
conceptual) require different cognitive processes to be used during study (Ramos 
et al., 2017; Roediger, 1999). More specifically, most explicit tests are considered 
to be conceptually-driven tests, whereas most implicit tests are considered to be 
data-driven (Ramos et al., 2017). However, as stated previously, there can be 
data-driven explicit tests as well as conceptually-driven implicit tests. 
Conceptually-driven tests rely on the conceptual and semantic processing of the 
stimuli, whereas data-driven tests rely on the perceptual and superficial 
processing of the stimuli (Ramos et al., 2017; Roediger, 1999). Jacoby (1983) 
depicts these differences well. Jacoby (1983) had participants engage with the 
study words in three different manners: no context (xxx-cold), with context (hot-
cold), or generating context (hot-????). In accordance with TAP, the “no-context” 
condition was assumed to produce the most implicit priming because reading a 




because the perceptual/surface features of the stimuli remain constant between 
study and test. The “with-context” condition was assumed to reduce data-driven 
processing due to differences in perceptual/surface features from study to test. 
The “generating context” condition was assumed to lead to greater conceptual 
elaboration than reading the word in context, which, in turn, should provide 
greater elaboration than reading it out of context. Their results reflected this 
ordering (Jacoby, 1983).  
In sum, the state of the literature suggests disagreement on perceptual 
priming. Some say that attention is necessary (e.g. Crabb & Dark, 1999) while 
others would suggest that divided attention at study/exposure will suffice 
(Mulligan & Hartman, 1996).  Further, TAP suggests conceptual priming relies on 
attention.  However, we might be able to imagine a context in which attention is 
naturally divided/degraded to test that idea versus gradations of attention 
wherein attention is paid.  This brings us to the implicit memory work involving 
online advertisements embedded in websites, a recent focus of study that may 
lend itself to the study of both perceptual and conceptual implicit memory. 
Conceptual Priming of Online Advertisements 
 Previous research, focusing on advertisements and the effects of implicit 
memory, has yielded a strong emphasis on perceptual methods of testing. 
Northup and Mulligan (2014, 2013) make a strong case for using conceptual 




a category exemplar generation task as a means of testing implicit memory. In 
line with TAP (see above), category exemplar generation was confirmed to be a 
conceptually based test because studies have shown that category exemplar 
generation produces higher levels of priming when there are deeper, more 
conceptual means of encoding (Northup & Mulligan, 2014, 2013). Northup and 
Mulligan (2014) tested the effects of manipulating the levels of encoding/attention 
at study on category exemplar generation. Their participants interacted with 
screenshots of news websites that had not been altered other than the 
superimposition of an ad. One example was the main page of CBSnews.com, 
though the authors are reticent about the gamut of the website captures used. 
The participants engaged with the multiple aspects of the webpage. For instance, 
they were specifically instructed to click on and rate their familiarity with the 
online advertisement embedded. Upon completion of the website evaluations, 
participants were then instructed that they would be partaking in a second 
experiment to gauge what brands were most popular among undergraduate 
students. This was done as an attempt to mask/disguise the memory test and aid 
in the avoidance of explicit contamination in the form of explicit memory of the 
brands shown. However, the results of their “awareness” questionnaire revealed 
that 35% of their participants became aware of the connection between the 
website evaluations and the brand-generation task for Experiment 1, 55% for 




with the embedded ad on either a deep or shallow level of encoding/attention. 
The shallow-encoding group was told prior to ad exposure to focus on how 
“readable” the brand name was in the ad, whereas the deep-encoding group was 
asked to rate how familiar they were with the brand depicted in the ad. 
Experiments 2 and 3 separated the levels of encoding as either forced-encoding 
or incidental-encoding. The forced-encoding group was identical to the deep-
encoding group in Experiment 1, however, the incidental-encoding group were 
told to merely “find and click on” the embedded at. Their results, after filtering out 
all “test-aware” participants, yielded significant priming effects relative to the 
control condition, regardless of the manipulation of encoding across all 
experiments. Surprisingly, the forced-encoding and incidental-encoding groups 
produced similar priming results, bringing in to question the need for direct 
attention or deeper levels of encoding at study.  
 Based on the studies described above, the current study will examine the 
effects of attention/encoding on conceptual priming of online advertisements. 
Northup and Mulligan (2014, 2013) emphasize ecological validity, yet, to our 
knowledge no one has investigated the effects of a more diffuse engagement 
condition. In all three experiments (Northup & Mulligan, 2014), participants 
engaged in the embedded ad. A more diffuse engagement condition would act as 
a more ecologically valid condition because typically people are not forced to 




examine the webpage at their leisure. As well, we are interested in examining 
whether the more diffuse engagement condition will yield similar results to the 
deep-engagement condition, as did Northup and Mulligan’s (2014) incidental- 
and forced-encoding groups. Northup and Mulligan’s (2014) control group 
produced a baseline measure (M = .17) for brands generated without previous 
viewing of these ads. This will be used as a baseline for the current study as well.  
 The current study will examine the role of attention in both sorts of implicit 
memory, perceptual and conceptual. Using Northup and Mulligan (2014, 2013) 
as a foundation, the current study will improve upon their methodology to 
examine variables that are, or have been known to, effect the role of implicit 
memory and online advertisements.   
Current Study 
 Based on the information above, and in line with TAP theory, the current 
studies examined several things. The first is the role attention plays in the 
perceptual implicit priming, specifically to that of online advertisements. This will 
be achieved by having participants view ecologically valid news websites, with 
online advertisements embedded.  Attention will be manipulated by having a 
more diffuse engagement condition and an engaged-with-ad condition.  The 




 H1A: A webpage-engaged condition (to be defined below) will recognize 
previously embedded ads at a significantly higher rate than ads they were never 
exposed to.  
H1B: Regardless of attention allocated to the embedded ad, participants 
will be significantly primed for previously studied ads relative to unstudied ads. 
The ad-engaged condition will show greater, but not significant, levels of priming 
against the webpage-engaged condition.   
These hypotheses will further support the argument that stimuli do not 
need to be directly engaged to be perceptually primed. In addition to perceptual 
priming, this study is also interested in the effects of attention on a conceptual 
priming task, category exemplar generation. In accordance with TAP theory, 
conceptual priming tasks act similar to explicit priming tasks in the sense that 
deep encoding is necessary during study in order to produce priming during test. 
Modifying and improving upon the methods used in Northrup and Mulligan 
(2014), the current study wants to examine the extent to which attention must be 
paid to embedded advertisements for them to be conceptually primed.  The 
following hypotheses pertain to Study 2 – Investigating Conceptual IM.  
 H2A: Participants in a webpage-engaged condition will name a brand as 
an exemplar at a higher rate for ads to which they have been exposed versus 




 H2B: Participants in an ad-engaged condition (to be defined below) will 
name a brand as an exemplar at a higher rate for ads to which they have been 
exposed versus ads to which they have not been exposed, with a greater 
difference between ad-engaged and webpage-engaged conditions due to the 
depth of the engagement.   
Method 
Participants  
 Participants included 143 undergraduate students enrolled in General 
Psychology courses at Stephen F. Austin University.  Demographic composition 
of the sample follows: 77.9% female (Mage = 20.0, SD = 3.1), 73.2% Not Hispanic 
or Latino, 67.6% Caucasian, 14.1% African American, and 8.5% other. Political 
Affiliation of the sample was 27.3% Republicans, 29.4% Democrats, and 43.4% 
no affiliation/independent. None of the demographics are considered to affect the 
study involving major American brand names. Compensation included partial 
course credit for participation in this study.   
Stimuli 
 Captured websites. Stimuli included 40 screenshots of popular and 
presumably reliable websites that would reveal a sophistication and coherence 
commensurate with the organizations. For example, we used a capture from 
CBSNews.com, as Northup and Mulligan (2014) did. While there is no absolute 




being mainstream and heavily trafficked recommends their use. One screenshot 
was taken of the 40 different websites (see Appendix A for full list and Appendix 
B for screenshot example). Our greater concern is for external/ecological validity. 
However, we would like to address the mild threat to internal validity incurred by 
using real captures. The intent was to capture the web pages of interest on a 
“slow news day” which was done on January 8th and 9th 2019, when there had 
been no major world events. With that in place, one might argue that the 
websites will vary even with attempts to constrain their variability. To that end, we 
constrained the appearance to the greatest degree possible to sites that have a 
similar number of vertical columns (three) and avoided those sites that deviate 
from the others fundamentally in appearance. Further, we would suggest that 
there is a range of sheer vividness when considering any stimuli, be they line 
drawings from Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) or Paivio’s (1969) words that 
varied on vividness. Further, and most stridently, the captures were rendered 
black-and-white to reduce vividness.  
Embedded ads. Advertisements corresponding to the list of 40 critical 
brands (and categories) adopted from Northup and Mulligan (2013) were 
embedded in to the screenshot of the webpage (see Appendix C for brands and 
their categories; see Appendix D for to be embedded logos; see Appendix E for 
ad-embedded webpages). All  ads are nationally recognized brands. There are 




roughly 1/32nd of the webpage screenshot and were placed in either the bottom-
right or bottom-left corner of the webpage. With the use of Inquisit, webpages 
and embedded ads were randomized in every manner. With a universe of 40 ads 
and 40 captured webpages, there are 1600 potential permutations that 
participants could have seen. Also, to help ensure internal validity all webpages 
with embedded ads were rendered black and white.  
General Procedure 
 Two studies were conducted, one perceptual study and one conceptual 
study. The studies were separated by method of test. For the perceptual priming 
task, we used perceptual picture identification; for the conceptual priming task, 
we used category exemplar generation. The independent variable for both 
studies was the level of engagement to the advertisement (see below).   
Passive engagement condition. Each study included a webpage-
engaged condition in which the participants did not engage the ad directly. The 
reader is reminded that the participant is engaging the webpage globally, and the 
embedded ad represents a fraction of the total.  For this webpage-engaged 
group, a webpage with an advertisement embedded was displayed (see Stimuli 
above) for 20s apiece. Following each webpage, participants were asked to rank 
the attractiveness of the overall webpage on a scale of 1-“Not attractive” to 5-
“Extremely attractive.” This was done as an attempt to get them to focus on the 




webpage, like the embedded advertisement. Participants were told that the rating 
they gave would be used as an aid for a future memory recognition task. 
Hastened or aborted answers did not compromise the study. The goal was to 
diffuse engagement with the site, wherein the ad is merely a part. The 
attractiveness rating for the overall page was consistent between studies.  
Engagement condition. Each study also featured an engagement 
condition in which the participants were instructed to interact with the embedded 
ad deliberately and not the entire page, as described above. Participants in this 
group were instructed to interact with the embedded ad by rating the 
advertisement on a scale of 1-5 relative to study task (attractiveness for 
perceptual, familiarity for conceptual; see below). As in the webpage-engaged 
condition, participants were instructed that this rating of the advertisement will be 
used on a later recognition task of memory.  
“Distractor” phase. Following the webpages, participants moved in to 
what they were told was a “game” to lengthen the time from webpages to their 
test of memory. This “game” is the IM priming task of interest, the nature of which 
depended on the sort of priming being investigated (perceptual [study 1] or 
conceptual [study 2]). This test was nominally misrepresented as an attempt to 
avoid explicit contamination through demand characteristics, as was advocated 
for earlier (MacLeod, 2008). Details follow in respective sections for the 




“Test” phase. Following the “distractor” phase, participants from either 
study entered what they believed to be the memory test component of the study. 
This was an explicit memory task of recognition. Participants answered 60 yes/no 
identification questions pertaining to advertisements that were either studied (had 
been embedded in the webpages), unstudied (tested over in task but not 
embedded in webpages), or untested (ads that were neither embedded in 
webpages nor tested over in the implicit memory task). Twenty questions 
pertained to the studied advertisements. Twenty questions pertained to the 
unstudied advertisements. And the last 20 pertained to the random 
advertisements. To protect against any potential order effects these questions 
were randomized for all participants. All 60 questions were the same yes/no 
question of “Do you remember seeing an advertisement for (insert 
brand/company name)?” 
Test-awareness questionnaire. Upon completion of the “test” phase, 
participants answered open-ended questions in a modified version of Northup 
and Mulligan’s (2014, 2013) “test-awareness” questionnaire (see Appendix I) 
directly on screen via Inquisit. This was to test for participants’ level of explicit 
contamination. Following the questionnaire, participants were debriefed and 






Study 1: Procedure Investigating Perceptual IM 
 Study 1 was the perceptually based study, testing IM using perceptual 
picture identification. Upon completing the consent form, participants were taken 
int the testing room where the computer for which the study was administered 
was located. Once seated, the researcher informed them of the overall 
instructions and then left the room to allow them to complete the study. On 
screen, participants read detailed instructions informing them of what is to come 
in the following section of the study. As well, they were presented with any 
instructions needed to understand and complete any and all tasks prior to those 
tasks being administered. For those in the perceptual study, after viewing a 
webpage for 20s they were asked to rate either the overall webpage (webpage-
engaged condition) or the embedded advertisement (ad-engaged condition) on 
an attractiveness scale of 1-5. This persisted for 20 trials. Attractiveness is a 
perceptually based rating because the participant must analyze the surface 
features of the ad, rather than interact with the ad in a more conceptual manner.   
 “Distractor” phase – perceptual picture identification. Once the 
participants completed viewing the websites, they entered the “distractor phase.” 
Again, the distractor phase is actually the implicit memory test relative to the 
experiment. In the context of the perceptual IM study, we implemented the 
perceptual IM task of perceptual picture identification. For this task, participants 




practice images to allow participants to get acclimated to the speeded 
presentation intervals, 20 pictures were ads that were previously embedded in 
the captured webpages (studied), and 20 pictures were never-seen 
advertisements (unstudied). Studied ads were perceptually identical to the ads 
they were exposed to during the study phase. To protect against order effects, 
and as an attempt to avoid explicit contamination, the studied and unstudied 
images were randomized. These pictures were flashed one at a time at a 
presentation interval of 33ms for each of the 40 trials (akin to Crabb & Dark, 
1999; Crabb & Dark 2003; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mulligan, 2002; Warren & 
Morton, 1982).  
Each trial began with a fixation point (+ + +) for 500ms. Following fixation, 
an advertisement was flashed on screen for 33ms. The speed of 33ms is long 
enough of a duration to be seen by a majority of participants. This 33ms duration 
constrained correct recognition but engendered differences in the dependent 
variable of accuracy as a function of the independent variable. A speed of 50ms 
tends to engender ceiling effects. A 2018 pilot by this author found that 33ms 
performed well (d = 1.34) and 17ms engendered floor effects, in which few ads 
were recognized. Each picture was followed by a mask. The mask is an image of 
densely overlapping “squiggly” lines presented for 500ms to make perception 
more difficult. Once the mask desisted, the participants were given 7.5 seconds 




brand. If they did not answer in the allocated time, they were forced to move to 
the next item. Once participants completed the implicit measure, the remainder of 
the study was identical to what was described in the general procedure.  
Study 2: Procedure Investigating Conceptual IM 
Study 2 used the conceptual IM test of category exemplar generation. 
Upon entering the laboratory, everything was identical to that of the perceptual 
task, except for the rating scale following each webpage. For the conceptual 
study, participants in the passive engagement condition were still asked to rate 
the attractiveness of the overall webpage on a scale of 1-5. Again, this is to keep 
them from focusing on one specific aspect of the webpage. Those in the ad-
engaged condition were asked to rate their familiarity with the advertisement on a 
scale of 1-5. Familiarity is used because it forces the participant to engage with 
the displayed ad in a more conceptual manner. Rather than encoding only the 
surface features of the ad, participants must conceptually engage with the overall 
company and think about how often or how little they are exposed to or interact 
with the displayed brand.   
“Distractor” phase – category exemplar generation. As in the 
perceptual task, once they completed viewing and rating websites, participants 
were instructed that they would be participating in a “game” to lengthen the time 
between the study phase and the test of memory. Again, this is done in order to 




contamination. Participants were presented with 40 category headings one at a 
time (see Appendix C,) and were asked to type the first exemplar that comes to 
mind of a product category, such as “frozen pizza” or “airline,” for example. Of 
the 40 category headings, 20 will be category headings relative to the ads 
displayed on the webpages (studied), and 20 will be category headings not 
relevant to embedded ads - but they are congruent to Appendix C. Participants 
were given 7.5 seconds to record their response in a provided text box on 
screen. If they did not respond during that time, they were automatically forced to 
the next screen with the next category heading. After completing the implicit 
measure, the remainder of the experiment is identical to the general procedure 
and perceptual study procedure.  
Measures for Studies 1 and 2  
 IM score. The dependent variable for this study was the participant’s 
overall implicit memory score. For this variable, the terms “Old” and “New” are 
referencing “studied” and “unstudied” advertisements displayed to participants. 
This score was determined by subtracting the number of Total New Correct Items 
from the number of Total Old Correct Items. Both Total New Correct Items and 
Total Old Correct Items were calculated by first determining which ads were new 
and old for all participants. After that, participants’ responses to their IM test were 
examined for correctness. If the correct brand name was entered then they were 




Old Correct). If the wrong answer, or no answer was entered, then the 
participants were given a 0 in both columns (New Correct and Old Correct). A 
total score was then calculated for both New and Old items. A higher score of 
implicit memory score indicated higher levels of Implicit Memory use.  
 Explicit contamination score. The reader is reminded that explicit 
contamination is the idea that participants discern the connection between the 
study phase and the implicit memory task, and then use this to their advantage in 
completing the implicit memory task. A total explicit contamination score was 
calculated for each participant based on their answers to these contamination 
measures. The scores ranged from 0-3. A score of 0 is someone who has no 
contamination, a score of 1 is someone with little to no contamination, a score of 
2 is someone with mild contamination, and a score of 3 is considered highly or 
completely contaminated.  
Along with the modified explicit contamination questionnaire (see 
Appendix I), we included an additional explicit contamination check. Following 
the contamination questionnaire, four additional explicit memory questions were 
asked prior to the participants viewing their random 20 webpages, all participants 
viewed the same four webpages. These webpages each included an embedded 
ad that was special to that webpage, and the four webpages were viewed in the 
same order by all participants (see Appendix E for two examples of the four 




remember seeing an ad for (insert brand name)?” If participants answered yes, 
they were also prompted to fill in a text-box with the name of the website that the 
advertisement was embedded in.  
Results 
Of the 143 participants collected, 137 were included in the analyses. Four 
were removed due to lack of implicit task data. All four of those participants 
reported a 0 score for both stimuli studied (old), and stimuli only presented at 
task (new) in respective experiments. An additional two participants were 
removed because their implicit memory score were deemed outliers of the 
sample. Their basic priming score, as will be defined below in respective studies, 
was very high in which performance on studied items was near ceiling and 
performance on unstudied/new items presented only at task, was near zero. 
Leaving them in the sample caused implicit memory scores not to meet the 
statistical assumptions of normality, skewness, and kurtosis.  
Covariates 
We collected two covariates to gauge the explicit contamination of each 
participant on two separate levels. The first covariate is a barometer of explicit 
“contamination” (see explicit contamination score calculation above). Blum & 
Yonelinas (2001) set a precedent that has allowed for a conservative 
interpretation of contamination, wherein self-professed contamination is taken at 




researchers accepted that claim at face value. We follow that precedent here. 
Indeed, as a maximum score of 3, the mean self-professed contamination score 
was M = 1.49 (SD = 1.14) for 71 participants in the conceptual priming 
experiment and 66 participants M = 1.56 (SD = 1.22) in the perceptual priming 
experiment.   
The second and more objective covariate is the explicit memory score 
(EM) in which the participant, across 60 trials, a) indicated whether he/she 
recognized ads that were embedded in webpages at study; b) correctly rejected 
ads that were not embedded but were part of the priming aspect of the 
experiment; and c) correctly rejected ads that were not presented at any time 
prior.  Incorrect recognition of these wholly new ads would represent false 
alarms. This EM suggested great participant discernment, significantly above 
chance for each experiment.  The mean EM score across 66 participants in the 
perceptual task was high (M = .78, SD = .10), t(65) = 22.21, p < .001 (inference 
test performed against chance level of .50); the 71 participants in the conceptual 
task also demonstrated high levels of EM (M = .81, SD = .12), t(70) = 21.77, p < 
.001.  
It should be noted that there was a second, informal indicant of EM as 
described in the Method. Participants were asked, in four separate trials, to 




the analyses, at four trials apiece, totaling 548 total trials, none were completed 
successfully.   
Analyses 
In addressing each of the two studies designed to address perceptual and 
conceptual implicit memory respectively, we completed five analyses within the 
context of the General Linear Model, a mixed-model Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA), three Repeated Measures Analyses of Covariance (RM ANCOVAs), 
and a hierarchical regression.  Given the presumed influence of each covariate, 
we ran a mixed-model ANOVA (with the status of the ad as studied or not as a 
within-participants independent variable, level of engagement as the between-
participants independent variable, and correct-answer responding/category 
exemplar generation for studied and unstudied ads as the dependent variable).  
Then, three RM ANCOVAs were run.  In the first, a RM ANCOVA was run with 
explicit contamination as a covariate.  Then, explicit contamination was used as a 
covariate with those most severely contaminated with a maximum score of “3” 
removed. The purpose of the nominal levels of contamination is to introduce 
levels of gradation in claimed contamination that is more refined and sensitive 
than the all-or-none method of Blum and Yonelinas (2001), who excluded the 
majority of their participants. Finally, a RM ANCOVA was run with explicit 
memory as a covariate. While all models will address homogeneity-of-variance 




Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity, because there are precisely two levels of the within-
participants independent variable (Field, 2013).   
Perceptual Task Results 
Participants engaged only to the ad by way of rating it yielded respective 
means of studied ads recognized (M = 9.97, SD = 4.88) and unstudied ads 
recognized (M = 6.27, SD = 4.48), yielding a priming score (M = 3.70, SD 
= 2.38). Participants in the webpage-engagement condition, wherein they rated 
the entire webpage, yielded respective means of studied ads recognized (M = 
10.67, SD = 5.51) and unstudied ads recognized (M = 8.64, SD = 4.47). This 
resulted in a priming score (M = 2.03, SD = 3.20). Inferential statistics follow.  
Mixed Model ANOVA. We begin with a mixed model ANOVA with a 
between-participants variable of engagement level and a within-participants 
variable of whether the ad was studied or not. There are no covariates treated. 
Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices was not violated, F = (3, 
737,280.00) = .94, p > .05 and Levene’s test of equality of error variances was 
satisfied, p > .05. With the ad-engaged (n = 33) and webpage-engaged 
conditions (n = 33) serving as levels of the between-participants independent 
variable, and ad-studied versus ad-not-studied serving as both levels of the 
within-participants independent variable, we launched a mixed-model ANOVA 
and did not find a main effect for engagement on speeded-identification 




engagement with the studied ad did not affect the participant’s ability to identify 
studied and unstudied items through speeded perceptual picture identification. 
However, we did find a main priming effect, the within-participants variable, F(1, 
64) = 68.19, p < .001, r = .52, such that, regardless of level of engagement, 
studied ads were identified on the perceptual picture identification more than 
those that were not studied or “new,” the definition of priming.  
Lastly, we observed a significant interaction between whether or not the 
ad was presented and level of engagement, F(1, 64) = 5.78, p < .05. This 
suggests that direct attention to the advertisement did not engender priming 
more than engagement to webpage.  
RM ANCOVA with all levels of explicit contamination as covariate.  In 
this RM ANCOVA, we test the effect of both independent variables with the 
covariate of explicit contamination with all levels included, 0-3. The homogeneity-
of-variance term was not significant F(1, 62) = 3.45, p > .05. Further, Box’s Test 
of Equality of Covariance Matrices was not violated, F = (3, 737,228.00) = 0.94, p 
> .05.  As well, Levene’s test of equality of error variances was satisfied, p > .05. 
Thus, we proceeded with analysis. Independent and dependent variables for the 
RM ANCOVA were consistent with those in the mixed-model ANOVA, except for 
including explicit contamination as a covariate.  
The first observed effect for this analysis was for whether or not the ad 




effect for whether or not the ad was presented in that context, F(1, 63) = 20.75, p 
< .001, r = .25. We also observed no main effect for level of engagement in this 
context, F(1, 63) = 2.14, p > .05, r = .03. There was a main effect for explicit 
contamination on priming, F(1, 63) = 6.22, p < .05, r = .09, suggesting that those 
who had higher levels of explicit contamination had higher priming levels than 
those with lower levels of explicit contamination, regardless of level of 
engagement.   
Lastly, we observed two interactions using explicit contamination as a 
covariate. We observed a significant interaction between whether or not the ad 
was presented and engagement, F(1, 63) = 5.60, p < .05. Participants in the 
webpage-engagement condition showed better performance identifying both 
studied and unstudied advertisements than those in the ad-engaged condition. 
As well, we did not find a significant interaction between whether or not the ad 
was studied and explicit contamination, F(1, 63) = .36, p > .05, suggesting that 
levels of contamination did not affect the implicit memory score of one condition 
more than the other.   
RM ANCOVA with level-3 contamination scores removed. The reader 
is reminded that those who had an explicit contamination score of 3 (self-
described as highly contaminated) were removed from this analysis. This 
removed 18 participants, causing the sample to drop from 66 to 48 total 




0.02, p > .05. Further, Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices was not 
violated, F = (3, 499,628.41) = 1.41, p > .05.  As well, Levene’s test of equality of 
error variances was satisfied, p > .05. Thus, we proceeded. Independent and 
dependent variables were identical to the previous RM ANCOVA. As well, results 
for this RM ANCOVA are similar to that of the previously described RM 
ANCOVAs.  
Similar to the RM ANCOVA with all contamination levels included, we 
found a main effect for whether or not the ad was studied, F(1, 45) = 20.85, p < 
.001, r = .32.  We also did not find an effect for engagement, F(1, 45) = .000, p > 
.05, r = 0.01, in this context. The main effect of contamination, although reduced, 
was still significant, F(1, 45) = 5.27, p < .05, r = .10.   
Upon removal of highly contaminated participants, the interaction variable 
effects were identical to the previous RM ANCOVAs. We did observe a 
significant interaction between whether or not the ad was presented and 
engagement F(1, 45) = 5.12, p < .05. We did not find a significant interaction 
between whether the ad was presented and the covariate explicit contamination 
for levels below 3, F(1, 45) = .15, p > .05. 
RM ANCOVA using EM as a covariate.  A third RM ANCOVA was 
conducted to assess the effect of EM. The homogeneity of variance term was not 
significant F(1, 62) = 0.82, p > .05. Further, Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance 




test of equality of error variances was satisfied, p > .05. Thus, we proceeded. 
Independent and dependent variables were identical to both previous RM 
ANCOVAs, the only difference is EM being used as the covariate rather than 
explicit contamination.   
The RM ANCOVA revealed that there was not a main effect for whether or 
not the ad was presented, F(1, 63) = 2.10, p > .05, r = .03, suggesting a lack of a 
basic priming effect in this context. Similar to the previous RM ANCOVAs, there 
was no main effect for engagement, F(1, 63) = 3.25, p > .05, r = .05. However, 
unlike the previous analyses there was no main effect for the covariate EM, F(1, 
63) 2.61, p > .05, r = .04. A plausible reason is the high percentage correct of EM 
scores and homogeneity of variance therein.  
When implementing EM as the covariate, the interactions between 
variables were identical to the previous RM ANCOVAs. We did observe a 
significant interaction between whether or not the ad was presented and 
engagement, F(1, 63) = 5.74, p < .05. We did not observe a significant interaction 
between whether or not the ad was presented and EM, F(1, 63) = .19, p > .05, 
suggesting that a participant’s performance on the EM task did not influence their 
implicit memory score in one condition more than the other.  
Hierarchical regression. For these hierarchical regression models and 
those describing conceptual priming, assumptions against collinearity were not 




each model was affected by the strong relation between priming and the EM and 
contamination scores, ranging from r = 0.58 to r = 0.33. We also monitored levels 
of variance inflation factors (VIFs). Though they did exceed the recommended 
levels of 1, no tolerances dipped below 0.2 (Field, 2013).  
A hierarchical regression was run to analyze predictors of perceptual 
priming including the highly correlated explicit variables of explicit contamination 
and EM on priming as well as engagement. The justification for entering 
engagement first was that it had the strongest relation with priming, r = 0.29, p < 
.05. Conversely, respective Pearson r coefficients for contamination and memory 
were 0.08 and 0.05 respectively, ns. 
As was strongly suggested in the process of our ANCOVAs, explicit 
processes apparently had relatively little influence over priming. In the model, 
engagement was predictive of priming, β = 0.29, p < .05 when entered alone, R2 
= 0.08 (Fchange = 5.78, p < .05), which, of course, is the just the square of the 
Pearson r of 0.29. The two explicit measures were positively correlated at r = 
0.33, p < .01, which does not threaten collinearity assumptions as the coefficient 
is well below r = 0.9 (Field, 2013).  However, given the robust coefficient, limited 
marginal variance explanation was yielded with the new predictor of 
contamination added to the model, R2 = 0.09 (Fchange = 0.36, ns), though it was 
significant. In the model, explicit contamination was not predictive of priming, β = 




The marginal variance explained by the addition of EM was not significant, 
R2 = 0.10, (Fchange = 0.46, ns). In this model, engagement was again predictive of 
priming β = 0.32, p < .05. In the model, the new predictor of explicit memory was 
not predictive of priming β = -0.09, ns. 
Conceptual Task Results  
Means for each condition, ad-engaged and webpage-engaged, can be 
found in Table 1. Ad-engaged participants named the intended product given the 
product category when the ad was studied (M = 7.64, SD = 3.54) and when the 
ad was not studied (M = 3.31, SD = 1.65), yielding a priming score (M = 4.33, SD 
= 3.70). It might be useful to clarify that when a product was named that was not 
studied, that is owed to chance. Participants in the webpage-engaged condition 
yielded respective means of products named given the category from studied ads 
(M = 4.20, SD = 2.31) and from non-studied ads (M = 2.26, SD = 1.62), yielding a 
priming score (M = 1.94, SD = 2.70).  
Mixed model ANOVA. We begin with a mixed model ANOVA with a 
between-participants variable of engagement level and a within-participants 
variable of whether the ad was studied or not. There are no covariates treated. 
Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices was not violated, F = (3, 
880,158.28) = 1.96, p > .05.  Also, Levene’s test for Equality of error variances 
suggested a slight inequality of variance with respect to the performance on the 




webpage-engaged conditions (n = 35) serving as levels of the between-
participants independent variable, and whether or not the ad was presented 
serving as the within-participants independent variable, we launched a mixed-
model ANOVA and found a main effect for engagement F(1, 69) = 28.00, p < 
.001, r = .54. This suggests that level of engagement affected the participant’s 
ability to name old and new exemplars through conceptual category exemplar 
generation, such that those in the ad-engaged condition were able to correctly 
produce the exemplars more than those in the webpage-engaged condition. We 
also found a main effect for whether or not the ad was presented, F(1, 69) = 
66.27, p < .001, r = .70, suggesting that participants were able to correctly 
produce the exemplar for product category regarding studied ads more than non-
studied product categories, whose production rate again owes to chance.     
We also observed a significant interaction between whether or not ad was 
presented and engagement, F(1, 69) = 9.61, p < .05.  It appears that the level of 
priming did appear to rely on engagement.  
RM ANCOVA with all levels of explicit contamination as covariate.  In 
this RM ANCOVA, we test the effect of both independent variables with the 
covariate of explicit contamination with all levels included, 0-3. We first confirmed 
a homogeneity-of- variance assumption with respect to the independent variable 
of engagement condition and the covariate of contamination.  The homogeneity-




parallel regression slopes in predicting priming is not met.  As we have already 
described the model without the covariate of explicit contamination above, we 
would like to proceed and list results with the understanding that independent 
variables of ad exposure and engagement cannot explain performance on the 
dependent variable independent of the covariate of explicit contamination. 
However, listing results here in tandem with a mixed model with no covariates 
will present a complete picture.  
The first observed effect for this analysis was from the two levels of 
engagement. We found an effect for engagement in the context of using explicit 
contamination as a covariate, F(1, 68) = 15.18, p < .001, r = .43. This suggests 
that for category exemplar generation, the participants who were ad-engaged 
produced more exemplars correctly compared to those who were in the 
webpage-engaged condition, in this context. As the violated assumptions would 
suggest, we also found a strong main effect for the covariate explicit 
contamination, F(1, 68) = 9.35, p < .05, r =.35, suggesting that those who had 
higher levels of explicit contamination correctly produced the category exemplar 
more than those with lower levels of contamination. Similar to the mixed model 
ANOVA, we also found a reduced, but still significant, effect for whether or not 
the ad was presented, F(1, 68) = 4.10, p = .05, r = .24. 
Lastly, we observed interaction effects. The interaction between whether 




2.52, p > .05. Again, as the violated assumptions would imply, the interaction 
between whether or not the ad was presented and the covariate of explicit 
contamination was significant, F(1, 68) = 14.00, p < .001.  
RM ANCOVA with level-3 contamination scores removed. The reader 
is reminded that those who had an explicit contamination score of 3 (self-
described as highly contaminated) were removed from this analysis. This 
removed 18 participants from 72 to yield 54. The homogeneity-of-variance term 
was significant F(1, 50) = 12.05, p < .001, only slightly affected by removing 
those scoring the highest.  The assumption of parallel regression slopes in 
predicting priming is not met.  After removing all those most contaminated, we 
observed no effects for either independent variable, as described below. 
Independent and dependent variables are identical to that of the previous RM 
ANCOVA.  
Results from this analysis reveal identical effects to the previous analysis 
including all contamination. We found a significant effect for engagement F(1, 51) 
= 6.93, p < .05, r = .12. Again, as the violated assumptions would suggest, we 
found a reduced effect, although still significant, for the covariate explicit 
contamination, F(1, 51) = 4.26, p < .05, r = .08. We also found a significant effect 
for whether or not the ad was presented, F(1, 51) = 4.99, p < .05, r = .09. 
Upon removal of the highly contaminated participants, all interaction 




ad was presented and engagement was not significant, F(1, 51) = 1.42, p > .05. 
The interaction between whether or not the ad was presented and the covariate 
of contamination was not significant, F(1, 51) = 3.53, p > .05.  
RM ANCOVA using EM as a covariate.  A third RM ANCOVA was 
conducted to assess the effect of EM. The homogeneity-of-variance term was 
significant F(1, 67) = 9.83, p < 05. Further, Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance 
Matrices was not violated, F = (3, 880,158.28) = 1.96, p > .05.  Thus, we 
proceeded. Independent and dependent variables are identical to the previous 
analyses, except for incorporating EM as the covariate rather than explicit 
contamination.  
The RM ANCOVA revealed a marginally significant effect for engagement 
F(1, 69) = 3.80, p = .055, r = .05, such that those in the ad-engaged condition 
correctly produced product exemplars more than those in the webpage-engaged 
condition. There was a strong main effect for the covariate EM, F(1, 69) = 17.04, 
p < .001, r = .20, suggesting that those who scored highly on EM also correctly 
produced more exemplars on the category exemplar generation task. There was 
also a main effect for whether or not the ad was presented in this context of using 
EM as a covariate, F(1, 69) = 8.92, p < .05, r = .11. 
When implementing EM as the covariate, we did not observe a significant 




69) = .01, p > .05. However, there was a significant interaction between whether 
or not the ad was presented and EM, F(1, 69) = 16.32, p < .001. 
Hierarchical Regression. A hierarchical regression was run to analyze 
predictors of priming including the explicit variables of contamination and 
memory as well as engagement. The justification for entering EM first was that it 
had the strongest relation with priming, r = 0.54, p < .01. Conversely, respective 
Pearson r coefficients for contamination and engagement with priming were 0.50 
and 0.35 respectively, p < .01. 
As was strongly suggested in the process of our RM ANCOVAs, explicit 
processes apparently had a strong influence over priming. In the model, EM was 
predictive of priming, β = 0.54, p < .001 when entered alone, R2 = 0.29 (Fchange = 
28.46, p < .001), which, of course, is the just the square of the Pearson r of 0.54. 
The two explicit measures were positively correlated at r = 0.58, p < .01, which 
does not threaten collinearity assumptions as the coefficient is well below r = 0.9 
(Field, 2013).  However, given the robust coefficient limited marginal variance 
explanation variance was yielded with the new predictor added to the model, R2 = 
0.34 (Fchange = 5.13, p < .001), though it was significant. In the model, explicit 
contamination was predictive of priming β = 0.27, p < .05.   
The marginal variance explained by the additional predictor of 




0.34 (Fchange ≈ 0.00, ns), with only adjusted R2 suggesting the scant difference. In 
the model, engagement was not predictive of priming β = -0.002, ns. 
Discussion 
General Findings 
The current studies investigated the attentional requirements for both 
perceptual and conceptual implicit memory tasks. Please note that the effect of 
engagement across the two halves cannot be compared statistically. However, 
informal comparison of the results was used to obtain an understanding of how 
attentional requirements affect participant ability to perform on implicit memory 
task.  In general, across both studies (not accounting for covariates) participants 
significantly answered more studied items correctly than unstudied. This result 
holds true regardless of the level of engagement to the embedded 
advertisements. For the perceptual task, results showed that levels of 
engagement to embedded ads did not significantly influence participants’ implicit 
memory. In fact, scores showed that those in the webpage-engaged condition 
correctly identified more studied ads than unstudied. This is in line with TAP 
framework suggesting that perceptual implicit memory is not influenced by the 
level of attention an individual gives to a stimulus. For the conceptual task, 
results showed that those who were engaged with the advertisement were able 
to produce the correct category exemplar for the given category heading. This 




works similar to that of EM, such that more attention and deeper levels of 
encoding are necessary for stimuli to be remembered. 
Improved Methods 
Improvements in perceptual and conceptual tasks. The current study 
offered an improved methodology to test perceptual and conceptual priming of 
online advertisements. For the perceptual study, we used a highly recommended 
test for participant recognition, picture identification (McDermott & Roediger, 
1994). In regard to conceptual implicit memory, Northup and Mulligan’s (2014) 
methodology compelled improvements for testing. Using Inquisit, we were able to 
avoid participants being forced in and out of various applications, tabs, and/or 
webpages. The current study rendered the webpages and their embedded ads 
as black-and-white to increase internal validity, whereas the previous 
researchers did not. Researchers also implemented a test condition of webpage-
engaged as a manipulation of attention. This condition corresponds to a more 
ecologically valid method of encoding webpage material and was not used by 
Northup and Mulligan (2014). However, we back Northup and Mulligan in the use 
of real webpage captures to further externally/ecologically validate the current 
study.  
Improvements in gauging explicit contamination and EM. The current 
study purposefully highlighted the importance of explicit contamination in several 




participants they would be engaging in a “distractor task” (the IM task) before 
being given their test of memory (EM task). Additionally, a speeded task was 
used for both studies (perceptual and conceptual). Researchers went to extreme 
lengths to measure and gauge the participants’ levels of explicit contamination. 
All participants engaged in an explicit contamination questionnaire as advocated 
by previous researchers (MacLeod, 2008; Roediger & McDermott, 1993). Within 
this explicit contamination questionnaire, participants were also given an 
additional four EM questions pertaining to the control webpages all participants 
saw at the beginning of their task. The explicit contamination questionnaire along 
with participants’ EM, were both used as covariates of general explicit 
contamination. Using both of these measures as covariates is something that 
previous researchers have not done. Additionally, we will highlight the effects that 
both of these covariates had on each task. 
Participant commitment as suggested through explicit measures. 
Researchers want to highlight the overall coherence of the current studies. While 
recognition memory is known to be powerful, participants showed EM scores of 
roughly 80% across all EM trials. As well, they showed 94% correct rejections for 
wholly-new ads. Both results should be taken as endorsements of participant 
commitment and a suggestion of ideal length of the task. If the task was longer 
and more taxing and the participants less vigilant, we might have less confidence 




up, also suggesting some task vigilance on the part of the participant. While we 
cannot fully endorse that the tasks tapped implicit memory, in a sense both tasks 
worked.  Whether the participants employed explicit or implicit memory, 
experience (studied trials) predicted the proportion named in each task in the 
form of speeded naming of the black-and-white ad or product naming in the 
category of the ad presented. In each experiment, a greater degree of priming 
was observed as a function of engagement. The magnitude of the priming was 
more enhanced in the conceptual experiment as predicted in H2A. As well, it was 
shown that perceptual tasks rely less on engagement as was predicted in H1B.  
Using EM as a covariate. As was described in the Method section, EM 
was collected by asking a series of 60 questions and totaling the number of 
correct responses. A correct response was tallied in one of three ways: 1.) 
correctly identifying a studied advertisement, 2.) correctly rejecting an 
advertisement that was never seen at study but appeared in the task, and 3.) 
correctly rejecting a completely new advertisement. A higher score would 
indicate a better use of EM. Across both experiments, participants averaged 
nearly 80% correct on the EM measure. There was no precedent on the best way 
to measure EM. The current researchers decided that asking yes/no questions 
would yield a more precise EM score; however, the yes/no questions can cause 
the scores to reach ceiling, resulting in the high (80%) correct scores. If the 




floor effect, potentially resulting in scores close to 0% correct, which is 
demonstrated in the four additional questions attached to the explicit 
contamination measure.  
Using explicit contamination as a covariate. Similar to the EM 
measure, previous research has not developed an accurate or standard method 
to determine participant levels of contamination. Blum and Yonelinas (2001) 
excluded approximately half of their entire participant pool without providing any 
reason or rationale. They took their participants’ responses to the contamination 
question at face value. If a participant said he/she were explicitly contaminated, 
the researchers removed them from the study. This action did not allow much 
room for an interpretation of the level of participant contamination. Because there 
is no standard methodology for contamination determination, the current study 
went to extra lengths to not remove people based on the face-value response.  
A less conservative, but reasonable, suggestion of contamination. Explicit 
contamination was determined using an after-task questionnaire.  The 
questionnaire included five questions pertaining to explicit contamination and four 
EM questions related to the control webpages every participant was presented at 
the beginning of the “study phase.”  The five questions were scored on a three-
point scale ranging from minimal contamination (score of 1) to highly 
contaminated (score of 3). Based on the articles reviewed, no previous research 




did here. This gradation allowed the current project to retain more participants 
rather than losing over half like Blum and Yonelinas (2001).  Based on our 
grading of the questionnaire responses, a total of 36 participants (18 from each 
study) were removed because they were determined to be highly contaminated. 
The inclusion of the four EM questions pertaining to the control webpages was to 
further test a participant’s contamination level. The researchers want to 
emphasize that out of 548 potential chances (137 participants each answering 
four questions) not a single one was answered correctly.  
A further suggestion of face-value reporting of explicit contamination. This 
result brings in to question the participant’s ability to be explicitly contaminated 
during the test phase on a speeded task. If participants could not remember 
seeing the control ad or the specific control webpage the ad was on when not 
under a time constraint, how is it plausible that they could recall the study ads 
and webpages, and then use that information to complete the speeded task (in 
either study)? Evaluating and analyzing explicit contamination is an area within 
this field of research that needs to be further investigated. 
Task vigilance across both studies. Researchers want to highlight the 
overall task vigilance that was displayed throughout the entire project. The timing 
and spacing of each individual section within the studies showed to evince and 
maintain participant attention. Had the individual tasks or the overall study (either 




participant commitment. With a longer study, or questionnaire, this would invite 
the participant to begin to lose focus and begin absentmindedly completing the 
study, rather than being attentive and doing their best to answer any and all 
questions/tasks given to them. This can be seen from the overall results of the 
individual studies. Had the participants been absentmindedly completing the 
study, the results would have reflected lower overall scores in all columns. 
However, as Table 1 depicts, the scores fluctuate between each variable and 
across both studies. This implies a dedication to the implicit memory task. As 
well, results from the EM measure have similar implications. Across both studies 
participants on average scored 80% on the EM measure. Readers are reminded 
that this score is calculated by answering 60 yes/no questions. A higher score 
indicates that the participant was able to correctly identify ads that were 
embedded and correctly reject ads that were not embedded/never seen. With 
participants averaging 80% across both studies, this suggests immense task 
vigilance. Had they mindlessly been clicking through the questions results would 
reflect scores well below 80%. This is another indication of task vigilance among 
participants.  
Two Orthogonal Tests of the Role of Attention on Implicit Memory 
 Readers are reminded that, although both of the studies in the current 
experiment are measuring implicit memory, the results from these experiments 




would like to highlight that comparing the results between the two studies (as is 
shown in Table 1) is beneficial when understanding the role of attention in 
different implicit memory facets. Participants in the perceptual study were less 
affected by the attention manipulation compared to those in the conceptual study, 
as Transfer-Appropriate Processing (TAP) would suggest. This effect is 
emphasized when looking specifically at the “studied correct total of 20.” For the 
perceptual study, those in the webpage-engaged condition were able to correctly 
identify (on average) more “studied” advertisements than participants in the ad-
engaged condition (10.67 vs. 9.97). Again, suggesting fewer direct attentional 
requirements for encoding to occur. For the conceptual study, results reflect the 
complete opposite. Looking at the same column – “studied correct of 20” - those 
in the webpage-engaged condition were able to produce the correct category 
exemplar (on average) at about half the rate of participants in the ad-engaged 
condition (4.20 vs. 7.64). Suggesting a strong need for a direct attentional 
requirement to encode the stimuli in a conceptual manner.      
An Address of the Perceptual Implicit Memory Task 
 Reliable priming in both between-participants conditions. Results 
showed that regardless of the participant’s level of engagement they were able to 
identify more studied ads than unstudied. This is exactly as H1A predicted; 
webpage-engaged participants will recognize previously embedded ads 




were able to strongly encode the perceptual features of the embedded 
advertisement. By neutralizing the embedded ad and the webpage (black and 
white), these results highlight how strong perceptual implicit priming is. Without 
the aid of color-specific logos, participants were still able to recognize the 
perceptual overlap between the embedded ads and the pictures flashed at them 
during study. 
 Non-significant effect for engagement. The main finding for this study 
showed that the level of engagement did not have any effect on the participant’s 
ability to identify studied and unstudied advertisements when presented in a 
perceptual picture identification task. This is exactly what H1B predicted; the ad-
engaged condition will show greater, but not significant, levels of perceptual 
priming. This finding falls directly in line with TAP framework, suggesting that 
there are fewer direct attentional requirements for a person to access implicit 
memory when prompted in a perceptual manner.  
The webpage-engaged condition: No need for direct attention to 
stimuli. Results further expressed that participants in the webpage-engaged 
perceptual task were able to identify more studied ads correctly than those in the 
ad-engaged condition. Finding that the webpage-engaged group identified more 
studied items correctly strengthens this paper’s argument on the position that 
attention is not required for activation of someone’s perceptual implicit memory 




Smith & Oscar-Berman, 1990; Spataro, Mulligan, & Rossi-Arnaud, 2010; 
Spataro, Mulligan, & Rossi- Arnaud, 2011). As well, it further validates the TAP 
framework that perceptual tasks do not require the same deep cognitive 
encoding that conceptual or EM measures need (Roediger, 1990). 
Examining explicit contamination as a covariate. When implementing 
participant contamination as a covariate the results showed similar findings to the 
previously mentioned analyses. Readers are reminded that explicit contamination 
was tested as a covariate in two iterations. One analysis maintained all 
participants with all levels of contamination, and the other analysis removed all 
participants that were deemed to be “highly contaminated” (3s removed). The 
analyses will be reviewed in tandem. Regardless of the participant’s level of 
contamination, the results showed that the effects of engagement remained non-
significant, as was hypothesized. This continues to uphold the TAP framework 
perspective that was addressed above.  
A significant covariate in perceptual priming. Further, both analyses 
revealed that explicit contamination had a significant effect on the participants’ 
overall performance. These results express that if participants scored high on the 
explicit contamination measure then they also tended to show a higher implicit 
memory score. This implies that the participants were cognitively aware of the 
connection between the study phase (viewing websites) and the test phase 




used this awareness to help them complete/answer the prompts on the 
perceptual picture identification. This could have been due not giving the 
participants enough of a time lapse between the study and the test phase, 
however researchers do not believe this to be the culprit. While a future 
researcher may allow more time between study and test, we question the true 
diagnostic nature of an explicit-contamination task. 
An overly conservative face-validity assumption of claimed 
contamination? Researchers want to bring in to question the authenticity of 
explicit contamination measures/surveys, especially in the context of perceptual 
picture identification. There are two major flaws in these surveys that go hand-in-
hand. The first is that we as researchers have no way to confirm the participants 
are contaminated. If they say they were contaminated then we accept that prima 
facie. This contamination flaw is what caused Blum and Yonelinas (2001) to lose 
over 60% of their participants. Further, there is no way clear way of trying to 
further break down the level of contamination. Researchers attempted to do this 
in the current experiment by scoring responses to the contamination survey and 
attempting to get a better understanding of the participant’s overall 
contamination, a rather homespun but necessary step. For instance, if a 
participant were aware of the connection between the ads and the perceptual 




aware of the connection and used this awareness to help them answer the task 
prompts?  
Implausibility of real contamination in the current study. This 
observational question brings in another component of contamination flaw that 
specifically pertains to perceptual picture identification and generally to any 
speeded task. When examining the current project, participants were flashed an 
image at 33ms. They also only had 7.5 seconds to record an answer before 
being automatically taken to the next question, which they did for 40 questions. It 
does not seem cognitively possible for someone to process an image flashed at 
33ms, reflect on the 20 webpages they were just presented, correspond the 
flashed image to one of the 20 pages they examined, and the input the correct 
answer in less than 7.5 seconds. This pattern would had to have persisted for 40 
trials, 20 of which they have to be able to realize that that image was not on one 
of the previously shown webpages. This issue will be further addressed in the 
following section. 
 Examining EM as a covariate. Along with explicit contamination, 
researchers examined the effect that a participant’s EM had on their ability to 
perform during the perceptual picture identification task. When implementing EM 
as a covariate, results showed similar results to the previously mentioned 
analyses; the participant’s level of engagement did not affect their ability to 




this continues to support TAP framework and the idea that attention is not a 
requirement for information to be stored in someone’s implicit memory. However, 
unlike explicit contamination, EM did not reduce the priming effect. As TAP would 
suggest, EM should not be correlated to participant performance within the 
perceptual implicit memory task. This is because perceptual implicit memory 
does not require the stimuli to be deeply encoded, as is needed with EM and 
conceptual implicit memory (discussed later).  
Perceptual Test Implications 
An apparent priming effect in the absence of direct attention. Along 
with methodology improvements, the results from Study 1 have strong 
implications for future research. Researchers supported both hypotheses 
relevant to the perceptual task. Though attention appeared to enhance priming, it 
did not enhance it to a significant degree. These results add to the debate of 
whether perceptual priming is affected by manipulations of attention at encoding, 
advocating for the argument that attention is not required. These results are also 
intriguing for marketing reasons because they show that even if deliberate 
attention is not attributed to an online advertisement, consumers are still 
encoding it at a shallow level.  
A modest proposal for recalibration of contamination. As well, due to 
improved methodology, this test yielded vastly fewer contaminated participants to 




had a significant effect, researchers want to emphasize the need for a more 
internally valid method for determining the level of contamination. If research 
continues to simply believe the participants and remove them based on this 
criterion, it will result in mass participant elimination as we saw in Blum and 
Yonelinas (2001). However, if this field of research adopts a scaling method – as 
we attempted to implement here – it will allow the researchers to see more of a 
full picture of the effect that contamination had on the results. It will also reduce 
the amount of participants that have to be completely eliminated from the study 
due to saying “I was contaminated.” By scaling contamination, it should allow for 
a significantly higher level of participant retention, a better understanding on the 
level of a participant’s contamination (“I noticed a connection” vs. “I used the 
connection to my advantage”), and clearer results on the effect of contamination 
on perceptual implicit memory.  
An Address of the Conceptual Implicit Memory Task 
Reliable priming in both between-participants conditions. The typical 
implicit memory paradigm held, in which studied items were identified as 
exemplars of products more than unstudied items. Results revealed that 
participants in either condition were able to correctly produce significantly more 
old items (previously exposed to) on the category exemplar generation task 
relative to new items. This result is exactly as H2A predicted; participants in a 




for ads to which they have been exposed versus ads to which they have not 
been exposed. 
TAP supports the effect for direct attention in conceptual implicit 
memory. Before accounting for either of the covariates, the results show that 
those in the engaged condition performed better on the category exemplar 
generation task than those in the passive condition. This would suggest that, 
unlike perceptual implicit memory priming, a participant’s level of engagement is 
crucial for being able to measure implicit memory when testing conceptually. This 
is exactly what H2B predicted; participants in an ad-engaged condition (to be 
defined below) will name a brand as an exemplar at a higher rate for ads to 
which they have been exposed versus ads to which they have not been exposed, 
with a greater difference between ad-engaged and webpage-engaged conditions 
due to the depth of the engagement.   
Further, the results not only support the researcher’s hypotheses but also 
add support to the TAP framework. TAP framework claims that conceptual 
implicit memory works similar to EM, such that for priming to take effect there 
needs to be an emphasis on processing the conceptual and semantic features of 
the stimuli rather than just observing the superficial features. They need to be 
forced to engage with the stimuli on a deeper cognitive level. Because of this 
need for a deeper level of encoding, TAP framework claims that conceptual 




the current study where the ad-engaged condition significantly outperformed the 
webpage-engaged condition. Participants in the ad-engaged condition were 
advised to only focus on the embedded advertisement allowing deeper 
processing of the advertisement, rather than trying to encode the entire website 
as the webpage-engaged condition was advised to do. Those in the ad-engaged 
condition not only had the advantage of being directly engaged with the 
advertisement, but they were also asked to rate their familiarity with the shown 
ad. Rating their familiarity with the ad forced them to encode the advertisement 
on a deeper level than those in the webpage-engaged condition, resulting in 
higher implicit memory score for those in the ad-engaged condition (Northup & 
Mulligan, 2013).   
 Examining explicit contamination as a covariate. As was done with the 
perceptual study, explicit contamination was used as covariate for the conceptual 
task. When accounting for explicit contamination (all contamination; those highly 
contaminated removed) the results were the same as previously mentioned. The 
engaged participants produced the correct exemplar on the category exemplar 
generation task significantly more than the passive participants. These findings 
align with the researchers’ hypotheses, as well as continue to validate the TAP 
framework. When testing implicit memory with a conceptual task direct attention 





 A significant covariate in conceptual priming. Additional results 
revealed effects identical to the perceptual task. When accounting for explicit 
contamination in the model, results showed that a participant’s explicit 
contamination significantly affected their implicit memory score. If the participants 
scored higher on the explicit contamination measure, then they also performed 
better on the category exemplar generation task. According to these results, it 
would imply that the participants were aware of the connection between the 
embedded advertisements and the category headings that were being presented 
to them during their task. It also implies that once they became aware of the 
connection between them, they used this to their advantage to produce the 
correct category exemplar on the task.  
More plausible contamination in the conceptual study. As was 
advocated for in the perceptual section above, the researchers again would like 
to bring in to question the validity of these explicit contamination measures. Are 
these accurate measures of their true contamination? The current study 
implemented a speeded task for both the perceptual and the conceptual task. 
This was done by forcing the participants to produce their answer to the task in 
less the 7.5 seconds. Similar to the perceptual task, researchers are still reluctant 
to believe that participants were able to read the category heading presented on 
the screen, filter through the 20 webpages they had just been exposed to (keep 




exposed to and realize that the other 20 headings were never mentioned in the 
webpages), correlate the ad on the webpage with the presented heading, and 
then type the answer in to the textbox. Participants would have to repeat this 
process for all 40 trials. However, due to the conceptual priming of the stimuli 
and the deeper levels of encoding, researchers are willing to concede that the 
participants may have been able to make a connection between embedded ads 
and the category headings after the fact. In other words, they did not become 
aware of the connection between the embedded ad and the category heading 
until after they had already produced their answer. But, because they were aware 
of the connection in general and because this awareness occurred before being 
given the explicit contamination survey, they believe that they had been highly 
contaminated. Their answer was produced implicitly due to the time constraint, 
but because they had conceptually encoded the advertisement so heavily, they 
believed this aided them during the conceptual implicit memory task. 
Researching ways to improve measuring and monitoring explicit contamination 
are highly compelled for, as it would further validate implicit and EM research as 
a field within cognitive psychology.  
 Examining EM as a covariate. An additional analysis was conducted to 
examine the effects of engagement on the category exemplar generation task 
when accounting for explicit memory (EM) as a covariate. The effects of 




engaged with the embedded advertisement performed better on the category 
exemplar generation task compared to those who were webpage-engaged. 
These results continue to reinforce the support for the suggested experiment 
hypotheses and further provide evidence for TAP framework. Like explicit 
contamination, EM was shown to significantly affect the statistical model. 
Participants that produced higher EM results also produced higher implicit 
memory score results. EM being correlated with participants’ scores on the 
implicit memory task is more plausible than explicit contamination being 
correlated. This is due to the encoding similarities between conceptual implicit 
memory and EM. As stated previously, conceptual implicit memory requires a 
deeper level of encoding to occur at study. Because of this deep encoding, it 
allowed for participants to excel on the EM measure (M = .81, SD = .12).  
Conceptual Task Implications  
An apparent priming effect significantly enhanced by direct 
attention. Study 2 offered many methodology improvements to previous studies. 
Along with these improvements, results revealed robust priming effects that are 
directly in line with TAP framework. The participants in the engaged condition, 
regardless of the covariates examined, always outperformed the participants in 
the passive condition. These findings add to the implicit memory research and 




A concession to, but difficulty describing, the role of explicit 
contamination/memory. Explicit contamination was shown to significantly affect 
the participant’s ability to perform on the category exemplar generation task. 
Researchers want to stress the need for extensive research on explicit 
contamination and how to better measure it. Whether that is implementing the 
measurement of purported contamination, as researchers attempted to do here, 
or a completely different method that somehow allows for researchers to have a 
better understanding of contamination.  
General Implications and Future Directions 
 The current experiment offers a magnitude of implications and is almost 
limitless on how future studies could adopt and improve upon theoretical 
framework and/or methodology. The major implication(s) was that the current 
experiment found robust priming effects in both the perceptual and conceptual 
studies. The perceptual task results revealed that when assessing implicit 
memory via a perceptual model, there is not a direct attentional requirement for 
the stimuli to be encoded. Whereas for the conceptual model, our results 
revealed that direct attention to the stimuli is crucial for proper encoding to occur. 
Both sets of results further validate and provide support for Transfer Appropriate 
Processing (TAP) as a theoretical framework for implicit memory research.   
Although the covariate of explicit contamination was shown to significantly 




truly influenced the participants’ answers in the manner that the statistical 
analysis would imply. As mention previously, researchers will concede that 
participants may have become aware of the connection between the embedded 
ads and the implicit memory task (perceptual picture identification or category 
exemplar generation). But the researchers will not concede that the participants 
became aware of this connection during the implicit memory task and used this 
to their advantage when answering the prompts. Researchers strongly advocated 
that their participants’ answers were produced implicitly, and the connection 
awareness took place after the face. This is why future research needs to 
exclusively focus on explicit contamination and better methods for measuring and 
monitoring the participants’ level. As stated previously, by improving the way 
explicit contamination is measured, it will further validate and strengthen any 
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 Proportion of speeded items named and proportion of category 
exemplars named for respective studies by engagement condition.  
Perceptual Task (n=66) 
 Old Correct of 20 New Correct of 20 Priming Score 
Engaged 9.97 (4.88) 6.27(4.48) 3.70(2.38) 
Passive 10.67(5.51) 8.64(4.78) 2.03(3.20) 
Conceptual Task (n=71) 
 Old Correct of 20 New Correct of 20 Priming Score 
Engaged 7.64 (3.54) 3.31 (1.65) 4.33 (3.70) 












Perceptual Picture Identification Regression Model 
 Variable            β      p     R2 
 
  Model 
1 
    
 
 Engagement  .29 >.05 .08 
 
 Explicit Contamination .07 <.05 .09 
 








Category Exemplar Generation Regression Model 
 Variable         β         p        R2 
 
  Model 
1 
    
 
 Explicit Memory .54     >.001 .29 
 
 Explicit Contamination .27 >.05 .34 
 






List of 40 news websites 
Title of page URL 
CNN https://us.cnn.com/ 
New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/ 
FOX https://www.foxnews.com/ 
USA Today https://www.usatoday.com/news/ 
Reuter  https://www.reuters.com/news/us 
Politico https://www.politico.com/ 
Yahoo  https://www.yahoo.com/news/ 
LA Times  https://www.latimes.com/local/ 
NBC https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
CBS https://www.cbsnews.com/ 
New York Post  https://nypost.com/news/ 
New York Daily https://www.nydailynews.com/ 
Newsweek https://www.newsweek.com/ 
Denver Post  https://www.denverpost.com/ 






Saint Louis Post  https://www.stltoday.com/ 
Chicago Sun https://chicago.suntimes.com/ 
Wall Street Journal https://www.wsj.com/ 
San Francisco Chronicle https://www.sfchronicle.com/ 
TIME http://time.com/ 




Kansas City Star  https://www.kansascity.com/news/ 
Providence Journal http://www.providencejournal.com/news 
WTOP https://wtop.com/local/dc/ 
Orlando Sentinel https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/ 
CBS – San Francisco https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/ 
CBS – New York https://newyork.cbslocal.com/ 
CBS - Minnesota https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/ 
FOX 2 Now – Saint Louis https://fox2now.com/ 
Daily Herald  https://www.dailyherald.com/ 
ABC – Washington D.C. https://wjla.com/ 




Seattle Post-Intelligencer https://www.seattlepi.com/ 
ABC https://abcnews.go.com/ 
The Onion https://www.theonion.com/ 
Wichita Eagle https://www.kansas.com/ 






Screenshots of original Websites (2 examples) 






List of Critical Brands (and Categories) 
Universal (movie studio) Advil (pain relief medicine) 
Jared Jewelers (jewelry story) Nikon (camera) 
Camel (cigarettes) Maybelline (makeup) 
Ace (hardware store) Shell (gasoline station) 
Dominos (pizza delivery) Orbit (gum) 
Nyquil (flu medicine) Snickers (candy) 
Enterprise (rental car) Wendy’s (fast-food restaurant) 
Levis (jeans) Southwest (airline) 
Ashley (furniture store) Colgate (toothpaste) 
Tombstone (microwave pizza) Payless (shoe store) 
Stouffers (frozen dinner) Samsung (cell phone maker) 
Playstation (video game console) Kibbles and Bit (dog food) 
Chase (credit card) Nordstrom (department store) 
Doritos (snack chips) Smirnoff (alcohol) 
Swatch (watch) Holiday Inn (hotel chain) 
Pepsi (soft drink) Clorox (household cleaner) 
Pantene (shampoo) Budweiser (beer) 
Toyota (car) Steve Madden (shoe company) 
Seventeen (magazine) Häagen-Dazs (ice cream) 










































Webpage with Embedded Ad 
Left:   
 








Informed Consent Document 
Study title: Looking at Websites  
Introduction to the study: The current study is within the department of 
Psychology of Stephen F. Austin State University conducted by graduate student 
Matthew Custard under the supervision of Dr. Scott Drury. You will be asked to 
view and study news websites, complete a series of questions, partake in a 
memory test, and fill-out a quick 5-item questionnaire. The information you are 
able to remember from the viewed webpages will be utilized in the memory test. 
Duration: Participation in this study will take approximately 30 minutes. 
Whom to approach with questions: If you have any questions or concerns about 
being in this study you should contact Matthew Custard at 
custardml@jacks.sfasu.edu. If you have further questions you may contact the 
SFASU Office of Research and Sponsored Programs at osrp@sfasu.edu or 936-
468-6606 if you would like more information regarding your rights as a research 
participant. 
Participant privacy: An individual’s results will be pooled with the results of all 




runs the software. These results will not include any identifying information, like 
name or student ID number. That information is kept separately and not able to 
be reconciled with the sign-up information you at the SONA site.   
Risks and discomforts: Minor discomfort due to frustration or fatigue may occur in 
some individuals. Therefore, be aware that if at any point during the experiment, 
you are uncomfortable completing a task or answering a survey question, you 
are free to skip that task or withdraw your participation by merely stopping.  You 
will receive credit anyway.  
Compensation: If participating for credit, you will receive 1 research credit1 for 30 
minutes of participation. If you should decide you no longer wish to participate in 
the study; you will not be penalized and may still receive credit depending on the 
instructor in the course in which you are enrolled. 
If you have read and understand all that is stated above and wish to continue 
please indicate so below. 











Thank you for participating in the study entitled, “Looking at Websites,” 
conducted by Matthew Custard, and Dr. Scott Drury. This study was designed to 
assess your memory for web embedded advertisements.  
 
After consenting to participate in this study, you were asked to analyze a series 
of webpages. These webpages had target advertisements embedded within 
them. Following the webpages, we tested your implicit memory with either picture 
identification or category exemplar generation. You were then asked to fill-out 
three surveys. One was a test of your explicit memory, the next one was to see if 
you participated in explicit contamination during the study, and the final one was 
a simple demographics survey. This study is designed to determine whether or 
not a person’s full attention must be given to an online advertisement in order for 
it to be remembered.  
 
As a reminder, your participation in this study is confidential, and your name is 
not attached to any answers you provided. If you experienced negative affect as 




Services, located on the 3rd floor of the Rusk Building, or contact their office at 
(936) 468-2401 or counseling@sfasu.edu.  
 
We respectfully ask that you not communicate to other students about the nature 
of this study or the predicted results until the completion of the project. If you 
have any additional questions or wish to be informed of the results of the study, 
you may contact Matthew Custard at custardml@jacks.sfasu.edu. 
 
Thank you for your participation. You may reach The Office of Research and 






















Perceptual “test-awareness” Questionnaire 
1. What do you think was the purpose of the study you just completed? 
2. When you were identifying and rating brand logos, did you think there was 
anything unusual about brands that you produced? 
3. Did you notice any connection between the brand ads embedded in the 
previously presented webpages and the brand identification activity you 
performed? If so, what did you notice? 
4. If you were aware of a connection between the brand ads embedded in the 
previously presented webpages and the brand identification activity you 
performed, were you aware of this connection when you were producing the 
brands, or did you only become aware of it after I began to ask you these 
questions? 
5. If you noticed that some of the logos corresponded to the brand ads 
embedded in the webpages, did you intentionally try to use brand ads from the 








Conceptual “test-awareness” Questionnaire 
1. What do you think was the purpose of the study you just completed? 
2. When you were producing brand names to the categories, did you think there 
was anything unusual about the categories or the brands that you produced? 
3. Did you notice any connection between the brand ads embedded in the 
previously presented webpages and the brand identification activity you 
performed? If so, what did you notice? 
4. If you were aware of a connection between the brand ads embedded in the 
previously presented webpages and the brand identification activity you 
performed, were you aware of this connection when you were producing the 
brands, or did you only become aware of it after I began to ask you these 
questions? 
5. If you noticed that some of the categories corresponded to the brand ads 
presented earlier, did you intentionally try to use brands from the earlier part of 










Explicit Memory Questionnaire 
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